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Abstract
Post-confl ict elections have become an important tool of international confl ict 
resolution over the last decades. Theoretical studies usually point out that in war-
to-democracy transitions, military logics of territorial control are transformed 
into electoral logics of peaceful political contestation. Empirical reality, however, 
shows that the election process is often accompanied by various forms of violence. 
This paper analyses post-confl ict elections in war-to-democracy transitions 
by comparing support structures for confl ict parties as well as their coercive 
mobilisation strategies in times of violent confl ict and post-confl ict elections. 
It does so through a single case study of KwaZulu-Natal. This South African 
province faced a civil war-scale political confl ict in the 80s and early 90s in which 
the two fi ghting parties – the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha 
Freedom Party (IFP) – used large-scale violence to establish and protect no-go 
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areas of territorial control. This study finds that in the first decade after South 
Africa’s miraculous transition, these spatial structures of violence and control 
persisted at local levels. Violent forms of mobilisation and territorial control 
thus seem to be able to survive even a successful transition to democracy by 
many years. Measures to open up the political landscape, deescalate heated-up 
party antagonisms and overcome geopolitical borders of support structures 
seem to be crucial elements for post-conflict elections that introduce a pluralist 
democracy beyond the voting process.
Introduction
Over two decades ago, a new instrument appeared in the toolbox of international 
conflict resolution: elections. As a central element of democratisation, elections 
were supposed to bring peace and a legitimate democratic regime at the same 
time. Expectations were especially high in the context of Huntington’s ‘third 
wave of democratisation’ and theories of the ‘liberal democratic peace’. However, 
scepticism about this practice became more and more pronounced as at second 
glance, the ‘arranged marriage between peace and democracy’ (Ohlson and 
Söderberg Kovacs 2009:165) seems to be full of contradictions.
On the one hand, empirical reality showed that elections in post-conflict 
environments are ‘an exceptionally risky venture’ (Reynolds and Sisk 1999:14, 
see also Mansfield and Snyder 2005). According to the Uppsala Conflict Data 
Program Peace Agreement Dataset, half of the peace agreements followed by 
elections between 1989 and 2004 resulted in violent conflict (Jarstad 2009:161). 
Elections thus do ‘not appear to be an instrument for enhancing the durability 
of peace’ (Collier, Hoeffler and Söderbom 2007:470). In addition to post-
conflict risks, electoral violence accompanied around 80% of all elections in 
Africa (Lindberg 2006). On the other hand, theoretical considerations put the 
cure-all power of post-conflict elections into question. Elections are a highly 
competitive mechanism to distribute political power, and especially war-torn 
societies dealing with legacies of violence are vulnerable to the effects of such 
inclusive conflict resolution mechanisms (Höglund 2009; Reynolds and Sisk 
1999). There are various incentives for armed groups turned into political parties 
to continue violent strategies in addition to parliamentary competition (Mehler 
103
Voting and violence in no-go areas, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
2007; Höglund 2008:83; Höglund, Jarstad and Söderberg Kovacs 2009:353; 
Laakso 2007; Dunning 2011). Furthermore, peace and democracy seem in some 
regards to be mutually exclusive goals (Jarstad and Sisk 2008). In short: post-
conflict elections and violence stand in a complex relationship, and there is a 
‘policy need for improved knowledge on the role of elections in building peace’ 
(Jarstad 2009:153).
While determinants for success and failure of post-conflict elections have been 
studied in detail through quantitative analysis,1 a more distinguished perspective 
on the different qualities and the specific logics of post-conflict periods is only 
recently emerging (Höglund and Söderberg Kovacs 2010; Richards 2005; Mac 
Ginty 2008; Suhrke 2012). This study wants to add to scholarly knowledge on 
post-conflict elections in war-to-democracy transitions by comparing support 
structures for parties in conflict as well as their coercive mobilisation strategies 
in times of violent conflict and post-conflict elections. It thereby follows up on 
the often posed argument around post-conflict elections. Electoral strategies – 
so it goes – are the opposite of violent strategies. While in war configurations, 
violence seems to be the central mechanism to accumulate territorial control 
(and thus political power), democratic systems are said to support peaceful 
voter mobilisation for electoral competition. This study aims to give evidence 
for a revision of this view. It argues that support structures as well as strategies 
to maintain support from the population can be very similar in both settings. 
The findings presented here add to the recent scepticism towards post-conflict 
elections as an all-in-one cure against violent conflict.
The article employs a single case study of KwaZulu-Natal. This South African 
province faced a civil war-scale political conflict between the African National 
Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP) in the 80s and early 90s, 
in which a geographical jig-saw-puzzle of party strongholds was established by 
violence. Political support for one of the opposing parties became obligatory 
and strictly related to territory. Four rounds of mutually accepted post-conflict 
elections as well as four rounds of local elections forced the ANC and IFP into 
a regional power sharing configuration. After a theoretical introduction, this 
1 For a comprehensive literature review, see Hug 2011.
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case study will follow three steps: First, the establishment of these ‘no-go areas’ 
of coherent support will be illustrated, with an emphasis on the role violence 
played. Second, violence in relation to post-conflict elections shall be analysed 
to show how patterns remained very similar to the ‘years of political conflict’. 
Third, the development of voting patterns in a number of former no-go areas in 
South Africa’s post-conflict elections will be compared. Here too one can see that 
voting patterns continued to match with the power configurations maintained 
by the former ‘patron’ of an area. The last part discusses the consequences of 
these findings and draws conclusions for post-conflict peacebuilding.
Territorial control and voter mobilisation: Theoretical 
background 
This paper argues that territorial control in times of civil war might show 
strategies of support mobilisation as well as geographic patterns of support very 
similar to those in the first decade of post-conflict elections. The relationship 
of violence, support and military control on the one hand, and of violence, 
voter mobilisation and post-conflict elections on the other, have been subject to 
previous theoretical work that shall be briefly presented here.
Territorial control is a main feature not only of conventional war, but also of 
civil war. It refers to military control in terms of successful defence against the 
intrusion of enemies, but also to a certain degree of political control. Territorial 
control means that ‘an insurgent organization which controls a given area 
[...] operates as a counter-sovereign authority, a “counter-state”. It provides 
protection, administers justice, collects taxes, and applies its social program’ 
(Kalyvas 1999:295). A minimum of support from the civilian population 
is therefore a crucial condition for local warfare. Compliance can thereby be 
induced by fear through violence. But as Stathis N. Kalyvas’ in-depth study, 
The logics of violence in civil war, of 2006 shows, (indiscriminate) violence against 
the population is a risky strategy because of its delegitimising effects. That is 
even more true in the shadow of elections: ‘A rebel group that relies almost 
exclusively upon coercion to control territory is unlikely to be successful in the 
postwar electoral period’ (Allison 2010:107). Hence, to get and maintain control 
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of a certain area, armed groups usually apply a dual strategy of contractual and 
coercive behaviour towards the residents (Metelis 2010:4–5). Territorial control 
in times of civil war is thus not merely a military business, but relies on support 
from the population.
In opposition to military logics, electoral logics appear to be characterised 
as a peaceful contestation in which ‘ballots take the place of bullets’ (Allison 
2010:107). The electoral process is often seen as an alternative to violence 
and violence around elections is consequently regarded as incompatible with 
democracy (Chaturvedi 2005:189; Fischer 2002). But democratisation is by no 
means a genuinely peaceful process. Elections are a highly conflict-inducing 
political instrument:
Elections, as competitions among individuals, parties, and their ideas, 
are inherently just that: competitive. Elections are, and are meant to be 
polarizing (Reynolds and Sisk 1999:18).
This stands contrary to the consensus-orientated aims of conflict resolution:
The very nature of elections has the potential to instigate conflict... To win 
support, differences are emphasized rather than the common elements 
which bring people together (Höglund 2009:421).
The competitive nature and polarising effects of elections play a crucial role in 
post-conflict societies. Here the given starting conditions are a weak economy, 
weak state institutions, insecurity, a patrimonial system of loyalties along lines 
of polarised identities and a culture of violence entrenched in social behaviour 
(Höglund, Jarstad and Söderberg Kovacs 2009; Höglund 2009; Steenkamp 2005). 
These conditions, as well as the high stakes in post-conflict elections, make 
the use of violence as a competitive means much more likely than expected by 
many conflict resolution practitioners. Violence does not only directly prevent 
elections from being carried out in a free and fair manner, it can also provide 
a background setting of fear and intimidation that influences voting patterns.
This study focuses on electoral violence defined as acts or threats of physical 
harm or intimidation perpetrated to affect the results of elections. This definition 
is more limited than the ones commonly used (e.g. Fischer 2002; Höglund 2009; 
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Sisk 2008) to exclude violence employed to boycott the democratisation process 
(also known as ‘spoiler violence’). Electoral violence as used here only refers to 
contexts in which the elections themselves are an undisputed mechanism of 
political contestation.
We can conclude that the ‘military’ logic of civil war and the ‘peaceful’ logic of 
post-conflict elections are surprisingly similar in that political power requires 
a minimum of support by the population. In times of war and after, armed 
groups have incentives to use violence as well as peaceful means of mobilisation 
to win this support. While in times of war the population’s collaboration needs 
to be won to gain territorial control, in post-war elections their vote is the 
crucial factor. This assumption serves as the theoretical frame under which the 
following analysis will be conducted.
The theoretical model must be treated with care because it reduces highly 
complex actors to coherent rational entities with a general strategy. The empirical 
reality of civil war however tends to reveal an interwoven network of local-level 
conflicts underneath the ‘master cleavage’, and a larger variety of violent actors 
(see for example Kalyvas 2003; Autesserre 2010; King 2004). As we will see in 
the following, this is especially true for the case of KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) where 
the local level plays a central role in how violence is produced (Schuld 2012a; 
Benini et al. 1998; Krämer 2007). Although the party frame plays a crucial role in 
most of KZN’s conflict narratives, it seems to make little sense to talk about the 
‘ANC’s or IFP’s strategy to gain political power’ once we have a closer look into 
the complex network of local power struggles. An actor’s ‘strategy’ as mentioned 
above does therefore not necessarily describe a group’s coherent plan to reach 
a certain goal. It rather refers to the mechanism resulting from a whole variety 
of actors and their respective strategies that sum up to a seemingly concerted 
agenda. The ‘rational-actor’ approach thus remains a theoretical construction.
The violent establishment of no-go areas during political 
conflict in KwaZulu and Natal 
South Africa’s transition to democracy was marked by high levels of violence, 
peaking in the years after Nelson Mandela’s release from prison in 1990. 
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The ANC as well as the apartheid government, between whom the roadmap 
towards a new political system was exclusively negotiated, both used a dual 
strategy of violence and political means to ensure that the new system would 
meet their respective interests. Especially black townships throughout the 
country faced violence in terms of sabotage acts, police repression and hit-squad 
activities on a civil war scale.
The area of what is today KwaZulu-Natal (KZN) was one of the hotspots of 
violence: of the estimated 25 000 people who died in the violent conflict between 
1985 and 1994, as many as 15 000 were killed there. Violence in this region had 
its own dimension and dynamics. The ANC’s liberation struggle against the 
apartheid system translated into ‘black-on-black’ violence between vigilantes 
of the conservative Inkatha party and ANC comrades. Inkatha (who turned 
into the Inkatha Freedom Party/IFP in 1990) governed the KwaZulu homeland 
and was initially aligned with the ANC apartheid resistance. In the late 70s 
the ideological distance between the two movements grew. Inkatha stood for 
independent traditional rule of a ‘Zulu kingdom’ as opposed to the ANC’s 
struggle for a national democracy. In the wake of their growing antagonism, 
Inkatha increasingly collaborated with groups from the right side of the 
spectrum, like the various police units active in KwaZulu and Natal as well as the 
National Party, taking the role as a ‘surrogate force’ of the apartheid government 
to enforce order in the region (Aitchison 1993:234). The violent conflict for 
political control between the ANC and Inkatha became the dominant frame 
under which the plenitude of local groups (vigilantes, the United Democratic 
Movement, the Congress of South African Trade Unions and many others) as 
well as violent entrepreneurs (warlords, taxi companies, ethnic groups, gangs, 
self-defence and self-protection units) fought their local wars. Fatality figures 
from ‘political conflict’ did only drop as late as the end of the 1990s, but violence 
continued in many forms and areas (Schuld 2012a; 2012b).
Violence played a major role in the IFP’s and ANC’s efforts to gain territorial 
control, which was closely related to ideological support. In the late 80s, when 
large-scale violence broke out in the Durban townships and later in the Midlands, 
no-go zones were formed through strategies of eviction and forced recruitment. 
‘The general pattern of this time was that vigilantes attacked and areas defended 
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themselves’ (Leeb 1988). Meer (1989) describes in detail how groups of Inkatha 
supporters armed with traditional Zulu weapons swept through residential 
areas, burning and stoning houses and beating up residents. In many violent 
incidents recorded in the Natal Violence Monitor, people were asked for their 
political affiliation, forced to sing songs of a certain party or simply threatened 
into leaving the area (see also Minnaar 1992a; Aitchison 1990). Recruitment 
campaigns were especially carried out at schools, from where male youth carried 
political alignments into the households (Bonnin 1997).
By the beginning of the 90s, neutrality had become impossible as being neutral 
meant being on the side of the enemy. Politically homogeneous areas emerged 
as people supporting other parties were driven out of the respective strongholds 
(Minnaar 1992a:5). In this way ‘a geographic area would become associated 
with a particular political group’ (Bonnin 1997:28). Coercive means to gain 
territorial control thus led to geographically coherent support bases in which 
structures of governance like taxation (on the ANC’s side ‘to support the armed 
resistance’) and institutionalised people’s courts were established. Violence was 
especially directed against the respective enemy. Bonnin (1997) describes how 
empty houses at the boundaries were patrolled by young men watching out for 
attacks. Township sections became inaccessible for people from the ‘other side’. 
The geographic divide deeply affected people’s daily routines. Taxi drivers 
crossing borders risked their lives (Kentridge 1990:36). Working across the road, 
loving a person from a different section, coming home from a birthday party 
after dark could mean death (Bonnin 2006). Although forced political affiliation 
turned out to be stronger in some areas than in others, by 1993 the region of 
what is today KZN had become a ‘jigsaw puzzle of party political strongholds 
and no-go-areas’ (Truth and Reconciliation Commission 1998:248). 
Coming back to the question of actor coherence, it is yet an open question as to 
how far the party leadership, namely Mangosuthu Buthelezi and Nelson Mandela, 
were actively instigating the violence. Both parties show a mix of antagonistic 
incentives. On the one hand military power might have worked as a useful 
threat in the national negotiations (in which the IFP struggled to participate), 
and territorial control promised a pole position in the shadow of upcoming 
elections. On the other hand, the demonstration of stability was crucial for the 
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ANC to calm white South Africans’ fear of a potential black government, and 
for Inkatha to advance their agenda of a strong independent Zulu authority. 
This view is supported by the various peace process efforts undergone by both 
parties and their leaders. Consequently, many scholars argue that on the local 
level violence ‘developed a momentum of its own’ (Simpson 1993, see also 
Johnston 1996:179; Woods 1992). As discussed above, both parties’ strategy 
of gaining and maintaining territorial control through the establishment of 
geographical areas of coherent support appears to have been the product of 
complex networks of actors and motives.
After the 1994 elections: Violence, territory and voter 
mobilisation 
With the regime change through South Africa’s first democratic elections in 1994, 
local governance posts were formally distributed through an electoral process 
as opposed to military power and territorial control. Elections as a political 
institution were initially highly contested from the side of the IFP. Inkatha used 
what is often termed ‘spoiler violence’ to boycott South Africa’s first democratic 
elections on 27–29th April 1994. The IFP had the bitter experience of being 
excluded from the ANC-NP negotiations about a new South African interim 
constitution. While the ANC advertised a nation-building process for a united 
and non-racial South Africa, the IFP strongly supported a federalist system 
with an independent homeland of KwaZulu for a traditional rule of the ‘Zulu 
kingdom’. This position was not only consistent with the official party objectives 
and its mobilisation along ethnic lines, but also reflected the IFP’s relative 
weakness in other parts of the country. When elections were announced for 
26 April 1994, the IFP refused to join and high levels of violence followed (Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission 1998:319). A week before the elections, the IFP 
leadership suddenly decided to take part. The speculation on motives ranges 
from Inkatha’s increasing isolation in the fragmentation of the right (Johnston 
1996) to successful mediation (Griggs 1996), and a ‘deal’ at the highest level of 
leadership to ensure undisrupted elections (Aitchison 2003). The last version 
is clearly supported by the great number of irregularities during the elections 
(Muthien and Khosa 1998; Reynolds 1994) as well as the striking result of 50,3% 
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or exactly 41 out of 81 provincial seats for Inkatha. Whatever motivated the 
IFP to join the elections, political violence decreased significantly in that week. 
From April 1994 on and up to today, elections or election results have not been 
disputed on a large scale.
We can therefore say that electoral logics replaced war time logics of informal 
control in KZN. As argued here, violent means to ensure the population’s support 
for and compliance with one of the conflicting parties remained very similar to 
the patterns before 1994. In 1994 the Independent Electoral Commission (IEC) 
reported on 165 complaints of no-go areas in South Africa (Du Toit 2001:66). 
For the parties participating in South Africa’s first ‘free and fair’ election, 
‘[f]ree canvassing in the province was impossible’ (Lodge 1999:122). 
Taylor (2002) conducted a detailed study of three massacres in Richmond, 
Shobashobane and Nongoma, showing how in these areas violence as a means for 
territorial control and power peaked in the years after 1994. Shobashobane, for 
example, is an ANC controlled ward surrounded by seven IFP dominated wards. 
On Christmas Day 1995, a concerted IFP mob attack on the isolated area, with 
a passive police and escape routes systematically cut off by roadblocks, left 
19 people dead. Nongoma and Richmond are examples of intra-party power 
struggles caused by defections, again determining control over territory and 
people. Krämer (2007) analyses post-1994 violence in Inchanga township and 
finds that fighting between strictly divided ANC and IFP supporting sections 
continued until 2000. But territorial control was not necessarily primarily in 
the hands of one of the two parties. Some geographical areas were controlled by 
strongmen like warlords, traditional chiefs or gangs that were only superficially 
related to a certain party (Shaw 2002:72). For example, in KwaMashu (Durban), 
township sections were controlled by different gangs, formed partly for reasons 
of self-defence and gradually taken over by criminal elements. Although ‘by 
1997 political violence between the IFP and ANC had all but completely abated’, 
the antagonistic gangs were mostly affiliated with the ANC (Nebandla 2005). 
Examples of hotspots of violence in the late 90s and early 2000s dominated by 
warlords are the above mentioned Richmond area under the (later expelled) 
ANC mayor Sifiso Nkabinde (Taylor 2002; Dunn 1998) and the shack settlement 
Lindelani under IFP warlord Thomas Shabalala. Reports on local strongmen’s 
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regime of terror and intimidation in rural Macambini can be found from as late 
as 2004 (De Haas 2009b).
These cases represent extreme examples of violent structures after 1994 where 
fighting still continues between geographically separated areas of support for 
either the ANC or the IFP. In other areas, post-conflict elections were more 
peaceful and people supporting different parties lived next door to each other. 
Like the cases selected in the third part, these examples merely serve to illustrate 
how support structures for armed groups or political parties are able to continue. 
The landscape of territorial control shifted in the last decade. The ANC was 
finally able to win a majority of votes in more and more wards, so that in 2004 
they won the provincial elections by a small margin and limited IFP supporting 
areas to the KZN northern heartland in 2009. According to Booysen (2011) a 
reason for this final victory is the success of the ANC’s liberation narrative and 
incorporation tactics as opposed to Inkatha’s ‘overcome’ ethnic approach. What 
is important here is that apparently more and more IFP no-go areas became 
penetrable for ANC campaigning and political activity, a fact also confirmed 
by township residents from Inchanga and KwaMashu in informal interviews. 
Although ‘pockets of territory in which non-democratic and violent modes 
of political behaviour persist’ (Bonnin 2006), the overall picture is that of an 
increasing intrusion through former borders, accompanied by a shrinking IFP 
power base. The ANC is on its way to becoming the unchallenged ruling party 
in KZN.
The decline of military forms of territorial control and high levels of violence, 
however, did not imply that violent mobilisation strategies disappeared. Electoral 
violence is a common feature of elections in KZN (Höglund and Jarstad 2011). 
Unlike in other African cases of electoral violence, the election days remained 
relatively calm (Du Toit 2001:66; Zulu et al. 2009) and results were mainly 
unchallenged. Electoral violence in KZN rather took the form of the disruption 
of rallies, prevention of electioneering in politically sensitive areas, attacks on 
party supporters and intimidation (Piper 2004a; Dugard 2003). Accordingly, 
violence mostly ‘consisted of public confrontations between ANC and IFP 
supporters over election related events’ (Piper 2004a). Both parties frequently 
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complained about the high levels of intolerance. The IFP for example referred 
to an ANC members’ demonstration at which coffins representing the IFP were 
burnt, and an IFP campaign in certain areas was prevented by roadblocks and 
car stoning as well as the attacking of an IFP councillor in Wembezi Township 
(Piper 2004b; De Haas 2009a). The ANC in turn alleged that Inkatha supporters 
were responsible for blocking access to areas, turning down posters as well as 
assaulting and sjambokking ANC supporters (De Haas 2009b). Attacks on 
political rallies thereby have a long tradition. Back in the late 80s and early 90s, 
political gatherings as well as funerals of victims from political violence were 
often disrupted by armed groups (Schuld 2012a).
A more severe form of electoral violence have been the notorious political 
assassinations that frequently happen up to today. Patrick Bond (2011:15–16) 
names a number of recent cases, especially in which leaders of ANC and IFP 
break-away parties were killed; obviously for political reasons. COSATU 
secretary-general Zwelinzima Vavi stated that 13 members of the COSATU/
ANC alliance were murdered ‘owing to political infighting’ (South African 
Institute of Race Relations 2011:707). Especially in the run-up to elections in 
2004 and 2006, ‘numerous killings of high-profile politicians belonging both to 
the African National Congress (ANC) and the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP)’ 
were reported (South African Institute for Race Relations 2005; see also Mottiar 
2006; De Haas 2008). Also, assassinations appear to be a heritage of the pre-1994 
period, in which the killing of political leaders – through petrol bombing of 
houses, drive-by shootings or hit-squad attacks – was one of the characteristic 
forms of violence (Schuld 2012b). 
As in the years of political conflict, the question of systematic coordination of 
violence remains largely open. Some clashes between supporters of different 
parties might well result from personal hostilities developed through decades 
of violence, or as Piper (2004a) puts it, were ‘cast as spontaneous conflicts 
driven by local people’. Reports on assassinations,2 denied access to areas and 
disruptions of campaigns, however, point to an at least minimally coordinated 
2 That have surprisingly never been systematically investigated by academics or civil society 
organisations (Schuld 2012b).
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shape of electoral violence. Whatever the degree of coordination may be, 
elections obviously remain subject to violent contestation, or, in other words, 
the ‘democratic way’ to gain political control of an area is still contested by 
violent means. Electoral violence thereby shows continuities from former 
violent patterns. It seems as if in KwaZulu-Natal, certain violent methods of 
support mobilisation slipped through the overall pacification to live on in the 
new electoral environment.
Voting patterns and geography of power in post-apartheid 
KwaZulu-Natal
The above analysis leaves us with a number of open questions. How is military 
territorial control before 1994 related to voting patterns after South Africa’s 
transition to democracy? Did pre-1994 territorial control directly translate 
into voting patterns or did support distributions change due to elections? How 
long were the parties able to maintain the support of the population in their 
respective strongholds? An attempt to answer these questions will be derived 
from a brief analysis of voting behaviour in some reputed former no-go areas. 
Information is taken from the South African Independent Electoral Committee 
(IEC). In order to limit the analysis and since South Africa’s system of municipal 
elections is complex, only national election results will be considered. The 1994 
elections are for two reasons not included in this analysis: First, the interim 
electoral commission responsible for organising the elections faced many 
difficulties and results are not available online for each voting district. Second, 
irregularities on the voting day like prepared ballot boxes, distribution of voter 
cards to children and the forced removal of observers seriously question the 
results for KZN (Reynolds 1994; Hamilton and Maré 1994). 
A first look indicates that the general pattern of IFP/ANC support survived 
the last 18 years, with the ANC gaining more and more support in former IFP 
strongholds. In the early 90s, the townships close to urban white residential 
areas of Durban and Pietermaritzburg were largely ANC controlled, while the 
IFP dominated the rural areas of KwaZulu. The South Coast region was highly 
contested as affiliations changed rapidly (Minnaar 1992b; Griggs 1996). After 
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1994, the South Coast showed ‘relatively 
homogeneous but sharply divided IFP 
and ANC zones’ (Taylor 2002). In the 
townships, the IFP created outposts of 
control through intense recruitment 
in male labour hostels. Until today 
hostels are said to be IFP affiliated. This 
rough picture is reproduced in voting 
patterns of the 1999 national election 
(see figure 1). Rural areas, especially in 
Northern KZN were homogeneous IFP 
strongholds, while the urban Durban-
Pietermaritzburg corridor was ANC 
controlled. The South Coast shows 
a patchwork of political affiliations. 
In the following elections, IFP support 
was reduced to the northern inlands as 
the ANC widely won support.
When comparing areas of territorial 
control with voting patterns after the 
end of apartheid in more detail, four 
obstacles appear. First, information 
about the actual location of these areas 
is crucial. Like other geographies of (in)
security, the map of political alignment 
in KZN was only known to insiders 
and difficult to reconstruct without 
extensive fieldwork. Information on 
geographic control therefore has to 
be distilled from case studies and 
monitoring reports. Second, areas 
often have informal names that are 
difficult to trace on official maps. 
Fig. 1: Election results of 1999, 2004, 2009 national 
elections in KwaZulu-Natal (Source: IEC 2012)
115
Voting and violence in no-go areas, KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Third, voting districts, the smallest unit for which election results are available, 
are not congruent with former no-go areas. On the contrary, boundaries often 
go through such areas or combine several antagonist territories. Fourth, voting 
districts’ demarcations were exposed to frequent change by the IEC and thus 
difficult to compare over time. Attempts were made to avoid these pitfalls by the 
selection of cases and by checking against other indicators of voting behaviour.
The first case under investigation is Inchanga township, located in a semi-rural 
area between Pietermaritzburg and Durban. Krämer (2007) gives detailed 
information about the political landscape (see figure 2). In the Fredville area, 
all sections except Tin Town were ANC dominated, while, as a result of severe 
fighting with neighbouring sections, Tin Town residents chose to support 
Inkatha. Voting patterns clearly reflect this division. In the 1999, 2004 and 2009 
national elections, the ANC won more than 90% in the voting districts (VDs) 
43400124/641/731/821/573 surrounding the area of Tin Town, with tendencies 
rising. In 2009, the Congress even won a share of almost 98% in VD 43400573 
and 43400821, leaving the IFP with around 1,5%. Tin Town is a part of voting 
district 43400584 in which the IFP won 76% of the votes in 1999, leaving the 
ANC with only 20%. The registered population in the area increased enormously 




in the last decade. In 2004, the ANC could catch up with 31,64% (against an IFP 
dominance of 64,96%) and finally won in the VD with 87,71% in 2009 (IFP: 
9,35%). What is interesting is the fact that the share of IFP votes continuously 
amounts to around 200 people. It is therefore likely that with the influx of more 
and more residents, the stable Tin Town IFP support was overruled rather 
than weakened.
The Shobashobane area 
in southern KZN presents 
another interesting case. 
Shobashobane is an ANC 
stronghold of about 240 
people in an area 
amounting to not more 
than 7 square kilometres 
and surrounded by IFP 
strongholds. It basically 
matches VD 43992535 
(see figure 3). For lack of 
sufficient information on 
the 1999 elections and in order to compare ward results, municipal elections 
will be consulted here as an exception. The election results report of 2000 
clearly shows that all voting districts but VD 43992535 had a significant IFP 
majority, while in this particular area 91,88% voted for the ANC. In the 2006 
local elections, all wards of the Izingolweni municipality showed equal shares 
of almost 50% for both parties, and in 2011, the ANC clearly led the wards. 
National election results produce the same picture. In the overall growing voter 
share for the ANC, Shobashobane still remains the most striking example.
A third case is Nongoma in northern KZN, a traditional no-go area for the 
ANC according to Taylor (2002). Two out of three local strongmen decided in 
March 1999 to defect to the ANC to enhance their leverage against the third, and 
opened an ANC branch in the area. This strategy led to a cycle of assassinations 
and counter-assassinations, and Nongoma mainly remained in the hands of the 
IFP. Unfortunately Taylor does not give further account on the more detailed 
Fig. 3: Shobashobane voting districts (Source: IEC 2012)
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aspects of political geography, which allows only for a rough analysis. The central 
part of the municipal area (see figure 4)  indeed shows relatively homogeneous 
high levels of IFP support in 2004 (municipal average 93,04%). The ANC 
average lies at 3,88% and the party only managed results close to 10% in VD 
43503432 and 43530016/38. 2009 shows a linear increase for the ANC in all 
VDs, with the municipal share rising to 15,61%, while IFP votes drop to 83,07%. 
The IFP stronghold Nongoma accordingly lasted a decade after 1994, but became 
penetrable for the ANC during the last five years. A very similar pattern is true 
for Ulundi, 50km South of Nongoma, where according to Nebandla (2005) the 
IFP headquarters were located. Also here persistently high levels of IFP support 
(around 93% in 1999 and 2004) were broken by 14,92% votes for the ANC in 
2009, leaving the IFP with 83,62%. In the prominent ANC stronghold Ndaleni 
in Richmond in turn, proportions of ANC vote remain constantly high at about 
96%, while the IFP has only been able to secure little more than 1% since 1999.
The analysis of post-conflict voting patterns in representative examples of 
KZN’s former no-go areas shows that support in the pre-1994 period directly 
translated into voting behaviour. Up to the 2004 elections, both parties won 
a striking 90% and more in their strongholds. In recent years however, the 
ANC was able to win voter support in IFP dominated areas, while at the same 
time maintaining their high performance in their own districts. An additional 
important observation drawn from this analysis is that parties apart from 
the ANC and IFP could hardly secure more than a 1% share of the votes. 
Fig. 4: Nongoma voting districts (Source: IEC 2012)
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The only exception is the Democratic Alliance, a party mostly voted for in white 
residential areas. On the whole, however, 18 years after the democratic transition 
the struggle for power in KZN still follows the ANC-IFP lines exclusively, and 
the ANC seems to win the fight.
Conclusion
This study has investigated patterns of support and support mobilisation around 
the post-conflict elections in KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa. During the country’s 
violent transition phase, support of a certain party was strictly associated with 
the geographical area a person lived in. Violence played an important role in the 
establishment and maintenance of these so-called ‘no-go areas’. After the 1994 
elections, a number of paramilitary structures of territorial control remained 
intact for many years and accounted for constantly high casualties from political 
violence in the region. Territorial control after 1994 also directly translated into 
voting patterns as the ANC and IFP were able to win between 90 and 100% of 
the votes in their respective strongholds, even as late as 2004. Elections were 
(and on a lower scale still are) accompanied by electoral violence in the form of 
rally disruptions, intimidation and political assassinations, showing a striking 
continuity from violent forms before 1994. Violence thus remains a means of 
political mobilisation and polarisation. 
A conclusion can be drawn for the ‘risky business’ of post-conflict elections. 
As remarked by others, electoral logics do not necessarily lead to peace, but are 
prone to various forms of violence. Violence does thereby not only influence 
election results through its manifestation of direct electoral violence or even 
resumption of violent conflict. It also creates and maintains a political geography 
of support structures that can be reproduced by post-conflict elections, in turn 
reproducing the use of violence. In some places of KwaZulu-Natal, this led to the 
survival of sharp boundaries between areas in which one of the two antagonist 
parties was supported, and conflicts continue to evolve around party divisions. 
The establishment of a diversity of political alternatives – since it is a vital factor 
for a post-conflict democracy to include non-armed political movements – 
seems to be severely suppressed. These observations feed the scepticism against 
the ‘cure-all’ power of post-conflict elections and point towards the importance 
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of the question of how armed groups’ support structures turn into electoral 
support. Measures to open up the political landscape, deescalate heated up 
party-antagonisms and overcome geopolitical borders of support structures 
seem to be crucial elements for post-conflict elections that introduce a pluralist 
democracy beyond the voting process. 
The case study, however, also underlines the important role non-violent 
mobilisation could play for armed groups turned into political parties. 
Especially in the long run, ideological mobilisation seems to be more than a mere 
supplement to coercion. The ANC was able to develop a nationwide narrative 
that links the party to the armed struggle and revolutionary victory. As Booysen 
(2011) points out, this is a main pillar of the ANC’s ongoing success story in 
times of increasing numbers of service delivery protests. The ANC furthermore 
succeeded in undermining the IFP’s claim of exclusively representing the ‘Zulu 
culture’, and South Africa’s third post-apartheid president Jacob Zuma often 
refers to his Zulu background by wearing the traditional dress of Zulu chiefs. 
The ANC’s increasing power in the last decade seems to finally put an end to the 
IFP-ANC stalemate in South Africa’s eastern province. Consequently, violence 
as a political strategy can never be analysed without taking self-presentations, 
narratives and other factors of ideological mobilisation into account – as a 
view of post-conflict elections without the frame of violence only produces a 
limited image.
Altogether, an academic effort to better understand the relationship between 
violence, territorial control and political mobilisation is necessary in order 
to advise conflict resolution actors on the risks and complexities of post- 
conflict elections. 
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